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Abstract 
Most theoretical and empirical research on cooperatives focuses on the 
comparative statics behavior of optimizing cooperatives. We focus on the 
magnitude and sources of variation in the dividend that cooperatives are 
presumed to maximize. Variation in the dividend leads to an inefficient 
allocation of labor among cooperatives. For a panel of 59 Spanish 
cooperative financial institutions, from 1994 to 2001, we decompose dividend 
variation into mutually exclusive and exhaustive sources. We also compare 
the performance of all other cooperative financial institutions to that of Caja 
Laboral Popular, which provides financial services to the Mondragón group of 
cooperatives. 
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1. Introduction 
Dividend-seeking cooperatives experience variation in their achieved 
dividend similar to the variation in profit found among profit-seeking capitalist 
firms. In testing various hypotheses about the comparative static behavior of 
cooperatives and contrasting their behavior to that of profit-seeking capitalist 
twins, empirical research has overlooked this variation in the dividend. The 
possibility of perverse behavior was introduced by Ward (1958) and Domar 
(1966) and has been analyzed by many subsequent writers, e.g., Neary 
(1988) and Kahana (1989). Pencavel (2001) surveys the related comparison 
literature.  
In this study, we develop an analytical framework within which we 
examine the dividend performance of a panel of 59 Spanish cooperative 
financial institutions (CFIs) from 1994 to 2001. We are not concerned with 
possible perversities in the behavior of optimizing cooperatives or in 
comparing their behavior to that of their twin savings and commercial banks.2 
We quantify the extent of variation in the dividend among these 
institutions and identify its sources. Throughout the eight-year period, the 
coefficient of variation of the dividend averages 0.33 with a maximum value 
more than twice the mean and a minimum value less than half the mean. This 
substantial variation has not decreased over time.  
Variation in dividends leads to an inefficient allocation of labor among 
cooperatives. As Bonin et al. (1993) note, dividend-seeking cooperatives 
adjust employment to the point where the value of labor’s marginal product 
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equals the endogenously determined dividend rather than to an exogenously 
determined wage rate as in a capitalist economy. Hence, variation in the 
dividend implies variation in the value of labor’s marginal product, which 
signals an inefficient allocation of labor among cooperatives.  
In a capitalist economy, the discipline of competition, in conjunction 
with the free mobility of resources to foster entry and exit, should decrease 
profit variation over time. However, dividend variation may persist in a 
cooperative economy in the absence of a complete market in transferable 
employment rights (Ireland and Law, 1981). Bradley and Gelb (1982) suggest 
that dividends vary because of entry screening procedures and exit costs, 
both of which constrain labor from moving to high-dividend cooperatives. The 
trade association of Spanish CFIs, Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de 
Crédito (UNACC), specifies general guidelines within which individual CFIs 
are free to set constraints on labor mobility. The guidelines consist of a 
nominal entry fee, no exit restrictions after a minimum tenure of five years, 
and permission for individual CFIs to impose more stringent restrictions. 
Although these guidelines do constrain labor mobility, they are much less 
restrictive than those imposed by the Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa.3 
Even within a homogenous sector such as financial institutions, in 
which human capital is transferable, cultural barriers and individual 
preferences constrain severely labor mobility among regionally dispersed 
CFIs.4 As a result, the market in transferable employment rights is incomplete, 
so that dividend variation with its resulting inefficient labor allocation are 
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sustainable over time. Since dividend variation is large and sustained among 
Spanish CFIs, we investigate its sources.      
 In Section 2, we provide background information on the 
institutional environment within which Spanish CFIs operate. In Section 3, we 
develop an analytical framework to provide an informative decomposition of 
the variation in dividends. This decomposition requires information on 
unobserved input-output combinations; in Section 4, we explain how the 
unobserved input-  output combinations can be computed from observed 
data. In Section 5, we describe our sample of Spanish CFIs and provide a 
complete decomposition of the variation in dividends, both over time and 
across cooperatives. Section 6 reports a pair of cross-sectional benchmarking 
exercises, in which the performance of all other CFIs is compared to that of 
Caja Laboral Popular (CLP), which provides financial services to the 
Mondragón cooperative group. Section 7 concludes with a summary of our 
findings and discusses their implications for the misallocation of labor in this 
sector. 
 
2.  Background Information 
 The first CFI in Spain, Papeleros de Buñol, was founded in Valencia in 
1858, although CFIs did not flourish until the turn of the twentieth century, 
with the appearance of Cajas Rurales (CR). CRs were associated with the 
Catholic Church, and provided financial services to agricultural cooperatives 
and individual farmers. Prior to the Spanish Civil War, more than 1,000 CRs 
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operated, although this number has fluctuated around a declining trend as 
some cooperatives have transformed into savings banks and others have 
disappeared. Beginning in 1959 and continuing through 1983, another type of 
CFI, namely Cajas Populares y Profesionales (CPP), was established to 
provide financial services to industrial cooperatives, e.g., the Mondragón 
group, and to professional cooperatives, e.g., architects, attorneys and 
engineers. In 2001, the population of CFIs consisted of 81 CRs and seven 
CPPs. Through their trade association, UNACC, all CFIs belong to the 
International Cooperative Alliance. As a group, CFIs hold 4% of total assets in 
the Spanish banking system, of which savings banks have 40% and 
commercial banks 56%. 
According to the decree Real Decreto 2860/1978, the Spanish Central 
Bank regulates CFIs, in the same manner as it regulates commercial and 
savings banks. In addition, CFIs are governed by legislation pertaining 
specifically to cooperative organizations. A sequence of decrees, going back 
at least to the Ley de Cooperativas of 1942, imposes limits on CFI 
membership. Enacted during the Franco regime, this law also imposed 
restrictions on democratic organization of CFIs, and constrained the growth of 
CPPs. The document Ley 13/1989 defines the objective of CFIs to be the 
provision of financial services to their members and to other people, firms or 
institutions. The original requirement that CR members be agricultural 
cooperatives and their members and CPP members be industrial or 
professional cooperatives and their members has been relaxed. In addition, 
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membership in both types of CFI is not restricted to their target clientele and 
may include related cooperatives, individuals and other institutions. However, 
Ley 13/1989 limits to 50% the share of financial transactions that can be 
conducted with other people, firms or institutions and requires individual 
members to live in the zone of influence of the CFI. The only additional 
restriction on membership is the requirement that a member deposit and 
retain at least 60 euros in a capital account and be approved by the 
Asamblea General of the CFI. No penalty is imposed for departing after a 
five-year membership.  
This legal structure imposes modest restrictions on membership and 
hence on labor mobility. However, individual CFIs may impose higher entry 
fees and additional restrictions. Given the modest restrictions, CFI 
membership typically consists of thousands of individuals and from a few to a 
few hundred related cooperatives and other institutions. However, CFIs 
typically have a labor force that is only a small fraction of the number of 
individual members. Employees are members, but not conversely, with two 
exceptions. CLP and Caixa Popular (CP), a similar CPP established in 1978 
to serve the industrial cooperatives in the Valencia area, have approximately 
the same number of employees as individual members. In these two CFIs, 
individual members must be employees. Employee wage rates are 
determined by triennial negotiations, called the Convenio Colectivo, between 
UNACC and the trade union. Negotiated minimum wages vary by job 
classification but, within each classification, they are uniform across CFIs. 
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Thus, any observed wage variation reflects some combination of skill 
variation, variation in the mix of full-time and part-time employment, and 
payment of above-minimum wages. 
 Profit is the difference between revenue and expense, which includes 
the remuneration of employees. Initially, profit is allocated to the payment of 
income tax and to the payment of interest on member capital accounts. 
Members receive the precio legal del dinero, currently 4.25%, plus a 
maximum of 6% on their capital accounts, giving them an incentive to deposit 
more than the minimum requirement. Remaining profit, called available 
surplus, is allocated to a mandatory contribution to the reserve fund, at least 
20%, a mandatory contribution to the education and promotion fund, at least 
10%, and discretionary cooperative rebates, which the Asamblea General is 
free to allocate as a voluntary contribution to the reserve fund, as an 
additional contribution to members’ capital accounts, or to other uses.  
The Asamblea General is at the heart of the CFI governance structure; 
delegates are elected to the Asamblea General in local, typically branch 
office, meetings. Each delegate has one vote unless the CFI statute specifies 
voting in proportion to a delegate’s capital contribution. The Asamblea 
General sets the interest rate on member capital accounts and establishes 
rules governing the allocation of the available surplus. It also elects the 
Consejo Rector, which is the governing council of the CFI. Among other 
duties, this body appoints the CEO and the executive board of the CFI. The 
Consejo Rector usually has from five to 15 members, at least one of which 
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must be an employee representative. Thus, employee involvement in the 
Asamblea General influences the distribution of benefits between employees 
and non-employee members and, through the Consejo Rector, the business 
strategies that determine these benefits.  
In practice, CFIs vary in determining interest payments on member 
capital accounts and distributing the available surplus. In 2001, mandatory 
contributions to the reserve fund ranged from the statutory minimum up to 
90% and mandatory contributions to the education and promotion fund 
ranged from the statutory minimum up to 40%. Consequently the 
discretionary residual allocated by the Asamblea General ranged from zero 
up to 70%. This variation could depend on varying degrees of employee 
participation in CFI decision-making. Since we have no direct evidence on 
employee participation, we cannot test hypotheses concerning the effect of 
participation on performance as Estrin et al. (1987) do for other cooperatives. 
Nonetheless, we have compelling evidence to support the hypothesis that CFI 
governance serves in the general interest of its employees, rather than its 
members.5  
First, employee benefits exceed considerably the negotiated minimum 
wages, and non-employee members do not receive these benefits.6 Second, 
the interest rate paid on member capital accounts averages 4.8%, which is 
close to the statutory minimum, and reflects a tendency to retain after-tax 
profit within the CFI. Third, excluding CLP and CP, CFIs allocate 75% of the 
available surplus to the reserve fund, which exceeds considerably the 
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mandatory minimum of 20%. These funds are retained within the CFI rather 
than distributed to members. Fourth, CFIs allocate 15% of the available 
surplus to the education and promotion fund, which is close to the mandatory 
minimum but also part of the generous employee benefits. Fifth, most of the 
available surplus disbursed at the Asamblea General takes the form of 
voluntary payments to the reserve fund, which reinforces the tendency to 
retain funds within the CFI rather than to distribute them to members.7  
 This distributional evidence is relevant to the question of whether CFIs 
are labor-managed firms or member-managed firms. In a pure labor-managed 
firm of the Ward – Domar type, members and employees coincide, so that the 
issue does not arise. In the subsequent literature, decision-making power 
rests with members, who may hire employees. Hence, optimizing behavior 
may lead to shrinking membership and expanding hired employment so that 
the firm degenerates to its capitalist twin (Ben – Ner, 1984, Miyazaki, 1984). 
In contrast, Spanish CFIs allow employees to exert disproportionate control in 
at least the distributional aspects of managerial decision-making. In addition, 
the member/employee ratio increases in CFIs, because employee self-
interest requires a sufficient number of members to provide the deposits to 
fund profitable loans. This incentive is reinforced by Ley 13/1989, which limits 
to 50% the share of financial transactions conducted with other people, firms 
or institutions. Without much access to external financing, CFIs expand the 
number of members. At the same time, employment growth is constrained 
because much of the available surplus is returned, directly or indirectly, to 
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employees. Thus, we characterize CFIs as labor-managed firms that require 
members to provide financing to support growth opportunities. 
 
3.  The Analytical Framework 
 Following the tradition initiated by Ward and Domar, we assume that 
cooperatives seek to maximize the dividend, or value added per employee. 
The dividend, denoted D, is defined as: 
 
 D ≡ (pi + wLL)/L = (pY - wTX)/L = p(Y/L) – wT(X/L),    (1) 
 
where pi represents the available surplus after taxes and interest payments on 
member accounts, wL represents the wage and L represents the labor input. 
Value added, denoted by pY – wTX, is equal to revenue pY, where p and Y 
are scalar output price and quantity, minus non-labor expense wTX, where w 
and X are price and quantity vectors of other inputs and T is the transpose 
operator. Thus, employee income consists of a wage, wL, and the available 
surplus per employee, pi/L. Although restrictions are imposed on the 
distribution of the available surplus, most of it is retained within the 
cooperative; very little is distributed to non-member employees. 
 From the first equality in equation (1), the variation in the dividend can 
be attributed to variations in quantities, i.e., Y,X and L, and to variations in 
prices, i.e., p and w. The second equality indicates that dividend variation also 
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depends on variation in the value of labor productivity, i.e., p(Y/L), and to 
variation in the cost of other inputs per worker, i.e., wT(X/L),  which we refer to 
as the cost of input deepening. Furthermore, dividend variation may be 
influenced by differences in technology, by differences in the cost efficiency 
with which other inputs are allocated, and by an activity effect that reflects the 
ability to convert input deepening into increased labor productivity. Figure 1 
illustrates these decompositions of the variation in the dividend. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 We develop an intertemporal decomposition from period t to period 
t+1, although the same approach could also be used to generate a 
multilateral decomposition. Denoting output per worker, i.e., Y/L, as y and the 
normalized input vector, i.e., X/L, as x, in equation (1) we have: 
 
        Dt+1 – Dt = [(pt+1 – pt)yt+1 – (wt+1 – wt)Txt+1] + [(yt+1 – yt)pt – (xt+1 - xt)Twt],(2) 
and 
        Dt+1 – Dt = [(pt+1 – pt)yt – (wt+1 – wt)Txt] + [(yt+1 – yt)pt+1 – (xt+1 - xt)Twt+1].(3) 
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Equation (2) combines Paasche-type price changes using comparison period 
quantity weights with Laspeyres-type quantity changes using base period 
price weights; equation (3) does the opposite.  
Since both Paasche and Laspeyres indexes suffer from well-known 
shortcomings, we combine equations (2) and (3) to obtain: 
 
 Dt+1 – Dt = {[½(yt+1 + yt)](pt+1 – pt) – [½(xt+1 + xt)]T(wt+1 – wt)}  
    + {[½(pt+1 + pt)](yt+1 – yt) – [½(wt+1 + wt)]T(xt+1 - xt)}.    (4) 
 
Equation (4) uses arithmetic mean quantities to weight price changes and 
arithmetic mean prices to weight quantity changes. The four components of 
(4) are price and quantity indicators of the type proposed by Bennet (1920); 
they are difference form analogs of ratio form Fisher price and quantity 
indexes. Whereas Fisher indexes are geometric means of Paasche and 
Laspeyres indexes, Bennet indicators are arithmetic means of Paasche and 
Laspeyres indicators. Bennet price and quantity indicators satisfy several 
desirable axioms analogous to those satisfied by Fisher price and quantity 
indexes.9  
 The first term on the right side of (4) is the price effect, denoted ∆P in 
Figure 1. This term measures the contribution of price changes, holding 
quantities fixed at their arithmetic mean values, to changes in the dividend. 
The price effect is the difference between an output price effect and an input 
Grifell-Tatjé, E. and C.A. Knox Lovell (2004), “Decomposing the Dividend,” Journal 
of Comparative Economics vol. 32, issue 3, pages 500 - 518. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2004.05.002 
 14
price effect. An increase in the output price increases the dividend, while 
increases in other input prices reduce the dividend. The second term is the 
quantity effect, denoted ∆Q in Figure 1; it measures the contribution of 
quantity changes, holding prices fixed at their arithmetic mean values, to 
changes in the dividend. The quantity effect is the difference between a labor 
productivity effect, denoted ∆(Y/L) in Figure 1, and an input deepening effect, 
denoted ∆(X/L) in Figure 1. Input deepening decreases the dividend because 
other inputs are costly, but it enhances labor productivity, which increases the 
dividend.10 The quantity effect can be decomposed further as the following 
proposition demonstrates.11  
 
Proposition: The quantity effect decomposes as follows: 
 
 {[½(pt+1 + pt)](yt+1 – yt) – [½(wt+1 + wt)]T(xt+1 - xt)} 
 =  - [½(wt+1 + wt)]T[(xt+1 - xCEt+1) - (xt - xCEt)]   cost efficiency effect 
   + [½(pt+1 + pt)](yAt – yt)                     technology effect 
   + {[½(pt+1 + pt)](yt+1 – yAt) – [½(wt+1 + wt)]T(xCEt+1 - xCEt)}activity effect 
  
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 2. The production sets in 
periods t and t+1 are labeled Tt and Tt+1. Production in period t uses xt to 
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produce yt, which is interior to Tt. Production in period t+1 uses xt+1 to produce 
yt+1, which is interior to Tt+1. The quantity effect is indicated by the arrow 
connecting (xt,yt) with (xt+1,yt+1), which can be decomposed as follows. The 
first component is a cost efficiency effect, which is indicated by the horizontal 
arrows connecting observed (xt,yt) with cost-efficient (xCEt, yt) and observed 
(xt+1,yt+1) with cost-efficient (xCEt+1,yt+1). This component contributes to or 
detracts from the dividend change as other inputs are allocated in a more or 
less cost-efficient manner in period t+1 than they were in period t, with the 
change being evaluated at arithmetic mean input prices.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
The second component is a technology effect, which is indicated by 
the vertical arrow connecting cost-efficient (xCEt, yt) on the boundary of Tt with 
cost-efficient (xCEt, yAt) on the boundary of Tt+1. Output per worker of yAt is 
feasible with cost-efficient xCEt and new technology Tt+1. This component 
contributes to or detracts from the dividend change as the value of output per 
worker is enhanced or reduced by the new technology, with the change being 
evaluated at arithmetic mean output prices. The final component is an activity 
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effect, which is indicated by the arrow connecting cost-efficient (xCEt, yAt) with 
cost-efficient (xCEt+1,yt+1). Since both points are on the boundary of Tt+1, the 
activity effect contributes to or detracts from the dividend change as the 
change in the value of output per worker exceeds or falls short of the change 
in the cost of other inputs per worker, with the changes being evaluated at 
arithmetic mean output and input prices. Thus, the activity effect is a quantity 
effect that is net of changes in technology and changes in cost efficiency and 
is expressed in value terms.12 
 To summarize, dividend variation is attributable partly to variation in 
the prices cooperatives receive for their products and variation in the prices 
they pay for their non-labor inputs. In addition, dividend variation is 
attributable to variation in quantities, which consists of the variation in the 
value of output per worker less the variation in the cost of other inputs used 
per worker. The proposition demonstrates that variation in quantities can be 
partitioned into three components, namely variation in cost efficiency, 
variation in technology, and an activity effect. We quantify these three 
sources of dividend variation. 
 
4. The Decomposition 
The decomposition into price and quantity effects and the 
decomposition of the quantity effect into labor productivity and input 
deepening effects can be achieved by straightforward computations based on 
Grifell-Tatjé, E. and C.A. Knox Lovell (2004), “Decomposing the Dividend,” Journal 
of Comparative Economics vol. 32, issue 3, pages 500 - 518. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2004.05.002 
 17
observed data. However, the decomposition of the quantity effect into the 
three effects identified in the proposition involves computations based on 
three pieces of unobserved data, namely, the cost-efficient normalized input 
vectors denoted xCEt and xCEt+1, and the normalized output using the new 
technology, denoted yAt. Since xCEt and xCEt+1 are cost-efficient normalized 
input vectors located on the boundaries of Tt and Tt+1 respectively and since 
yAt is a maximum normalized output located on the boundary of Tt+1, frontier 
techniques are appropriate. We use an extension of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), which is a linear programming technique introduced by 
Charnes et al. (1978) to evaluate producer performance.13 The technique 
constructs best practice frontiers, which provide empirical approximations to 
the boundaries of Tt and Tt+1, and measures the performance of each 
producer relative to the best practice observed in the sample.  
To identify xCEt and xCEt+1 we construct production frontiers for years t 
and t+1 and we compare these production frontiers to identify yAt. In 
conventional DEA, a best practice frontier for year t is constructed from data 
on all producers in year t. Consequently, best practices in previous years are 
not used in year t. Our extension allows the best practice in year t to be 
constructed from data on all producers in all years prior to and including year 
t. Hence, best practices in previous years are remembered and remain 
available for adoption in the current year.14 
Grifell-Tatjé, E. and C.A. Knox Lovell (2004), “Decomposing the Dividend,” Journal 
of Comparative Economics vol. 32, issue 3, pages 500 - 518. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2004.05.002 
 18
We define the feasible set of production activities in year t as: 
 
Tt = {(y, x): y ≦ Σiλiyis, x ≧ Σiλixis, λi ≧ 0, Σiλi = 1, s=1,…,t}.  (5) 
 
Hence, (y,x) is bounded above by a piecewise linear envelope characterizing 
the best practice observed in all years from year 1 through year t inclusive. In 
year t, output per worker y cannot exceed a convex combination of output per 
worker of all cooperatives in all years prior to and including year t, denoted by 
Σiλiyis. Similarly, in year t the normalized input vector x cannot be smaller 
than a convex combination of normalized input vectors of all cooperatives in 
all years prior to and including year t, denoted by Σiλixis. Thus, the vector λ 
has dimension I1 in year 1, I1+I2 in year 2, and Σs=1TIs in year T, where Is is the 
number of producers in year s. 
 The convexity constraint Σiλi = 1 allows the approximating technology 
Tt to satisfy variable returns to scale and to envelop the data tightly. Deleting 
the constraint would impose constant returns to scale on Tt and would not 
allow the technology to envelop the data as closely. Moreover, cooperatives 
are expected to operate in the increasing returns to scale segment of the 
technology for a variety of reasons, including attenuated access to external 
finance. Since the per-worker technology relates y = Y/L to x = X/L, imposing 
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constant returns to scale would require increasing returns to scale in the 
technology relating Y to (X,L). Since we prefer to test for returns to scale 
rather than impose a restriction, we retain the convexity constraint.  
The cost-efficient normalized input bundle, denoted xCEt in Figure 2, 
minimizes the other input cost of producing yt, given other input prices wt and 
technology Tt as defined in (5). To identify this bundle, we solve the following 
linear program for each cooperative, i=1,…,o,…,It, in each year, t=1,…,T. 
 
xCEot  =  minx wotTx 
 s.t.  x ≧ Σiλixis 
           yot ≦ Σiλiyis 
   λi ≧ 0, Σiλi = 1.       (6) 
 
For any cooperative designated o in year t, the cost-efficient normalized input 
vector xCEot is the vector x that minimizes wotTx, subject to the constraint that 
(xCEot,yot) cannot surpass best practice standards established by all 
cooperatives in all years prior to and including year t. This program is solved 
Σs=1TIs times, once for each cooperative in each year. 
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 The new technology output per worker, denoted yAt in Figure 2, 
represents the maximum output per worker that could be obtained from using 
cost-efficient xCEt with the new technology, Tt+1. To identify this point, we solve 
the following linear program for each cooperative, i=1,…,o,…,It, in each year, 
t=1,…,T-1. 
 
  yoAt / yot  =  maxφ  φ 
 s.t. xCEot ≧ ΣiλixCEis+1 
     φyot ≦ Σiλiyis+1 
        λi ≧ 0, Σiλi = 1.       (7)
   
For cooperative o in year t, the program seeks the maximum expansion of yot 
subject to the constraint that (xCEot,φyot) cannot surpass best practice 
standards established by all cooperatives in all years prior to and including 
year t+1. Then the new technology output per worker, denoted yoAt is obtained 
from setting yoAt equal to φyot. This procedure identifies the output per worker 
that would be feasible with cost-efficient year t normalized inputs xCEot and 
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period t+1 technology Tt+1, so that it provides a local measure of technical 
change. This program is solved Σs=1T-1Is times, once for each cooperative in 
each year, but we must exclude the terminal year because data are not 
available for year T+1. 
 Solving the above programs yields values of the unobserved 
quantities, i.e., xCEt, xCEt+1 and yAt, for all cooperatives in all years. Inserting 
these quantities into the proposition generates a complete decomposition of 
variation of the dividend, both over time and across cooperatives. In the next 
section we use data from our sample of Spanish CFIs to calculate these 
sources of variation in the dividend of cooperatives. 
 
5. Data and Decomposition Results 
Summary statistics of the relevant variables for 59 CFIs from 1994 to 
2001 are summarized in Table 1. The data are organized according to an 
intermediation view of financial institution performance in which deposits are 
combined with other inputs, i.e., labor and non-financial assets, to produce 
revenue-generating loans and other investments.15 Annual mean wages have 
grown by 3.1% per year to a 2001 value of nearly €38,000, while annual 
mean dividends have grown by 3.9% per year to a 2001 value of over 
€70,000. This growth occurred despite a continuing decline in annual mean 
rates of return on loans and other investments, by nearly 40% during the 
period.16 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
As expected in an increasingly competitive financial services market, 
the variation in pricing power is minimal with annual coefficients of variation of 
output prices and input prices averaging less than 10% except for non-
financial assets. In contrast, the coefficients of variation of output quantities 
and input quantities average 190%. Hence, we expect price effects to be 
dominated by quantity effects as sources of dividend variation. The relative 
uniformity of wages, with an average coefficient of variation of 15%, does not 
imply a relatively efficient allocation of labor because employment decisions 
depend on the dividend rather than on wages. The coefficient of variation of 
the dividend has remained stable at an average of 33% over the period.  
 Table 2 provides an initial decomposition of the dividend variation, both 
annually and for the entire period. On average, the dividend increases 
annually by €2,400. This growth reflects the impact of a substantial decline in 
the Bennet price indicator countervailed by a larger increase in the Bennet 
quantity indicator. In equation (4), the price indicator is quantity-weighted and 
the quantity indicator is price-weighted. Hence, a negative price effect 
indicates that price changes lead to an average annual reduction in the 
dividend of €3,210. However, this decrease is more than offset by quantity 
growth that generates an average annual increase in the dividend of €5,610. 
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Therefore, dividend performance improves over the period despite a 
deteriorating price structure.16 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 The final two columns of Table 2 provide an initial decomposition of the 
quantity effect. Since quantity effects are price-weighted, these results 
suggest that the value of output per worker increased by far more than did the 
cost of other inputs per worker. The labor productivity effect generated an 
average annual increase in the dividend of €11,830, while the input 
deepening effect caused an average annual reduction in the dividend of 
€6,220.18 Hence, although input deepening is costly, it is productive and 
profitable at a positive spread. 
 Table 3 provides the decomposition of the quantity effect, both 
annually and for the entire period. The activity effect accounts for more than 
the entire quantity effect, contributing an average annual increase of €6,480 
to the dividend. This result is consistent with our argument that CFIs are 
motivated to expand internally by increasing their memberships, which 
provide the deposits to finance growth. The activity effect is augmented by a 
small improvement in technology that enhanced labor productivity and led to 
an average annual increase of €290 in the dividend. Offsetting these two 
effects is a general deterioration in cost efficiency that led to an average 
annual decline of €1,160.19 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
 
 To summarize our aggregate time series findings, the observed 
upward trend in the dividend occurs despite a continuing decline in the spread 
between the rates of return on loans and investments and interest rates paid 
to depositors, which generate an adverse price effect. In addition, input 
deepening is costly and generates an adverse impact on the quantity effect. 
However, input deepening has three impacts on the increase in labor 
productivity, two of which are favorable. Increases in deposits per worker fund 
increases in loans and investments per worker, which enhances labor 
productivity and raises the dividend because the spread is positive although 
declining. Increases in non-financial capital per worker, e.g., investments in 
information technology, generate improvements in technology, which also 
enhances labor productivity and raises the dividend. However, input 
deepening does not occur in a cost-efficient manner, given input price trends; 
the decline in cost efficiency causes a small reduction in labor productivity 
and reduces the dividend. Ironically, the decline in cost efficiency can be 
traced to over-investment in non-financial capital, the price of which declined 
modestly, rather than to excessive deposit taking, the price of which declined 
dramatically in the middle half of the period.20  
 
6. Comparisons Between CLP and Other Spanish CFIs 
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In this section, we turn our attention to an investigation into 
disaggregate cross section variation in the dividend. We conduct a sequence 
of annual benchmarking exercises in which the financial performance of 
individual CFIs is compared to that of CLP. Although CLP did not earn the 
largest dividend in any year, we choose it as a benchmark because it is the 
largest and most widely known CFI.  To decompose cross-sectional dividend 
variation, we follow the same procedure used for the aggregate time series 
analysis with two exceptions. First, variation now refers to the difference 
between CLP and each other CFI. Hence, (Dt+1 – Dt) becomes (DCLP – DCFI), 
and similar changes are made for all other variables. Second, technical 
change is not feasible in a single year; hence, the technical change effect 
disappears and dividend variation decomposes into an activity effect and a 
cost efficiency effect only.21 
The results of these exercises are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 
contains benchmarking results averaged over CFIs having smaller dividends 
than CLP to investigate what these less-successful CFIs can learn from CLP. 
Table 5 contains benchmarking results averaged over CFIs having larger 
dividends than CLP to investigate what CLP can learn from these more-
successful CFIs. The number of less-successful CFIs varies from 45 to 56, 
while the number of more-successful CFIs ranges from two to 13. Since both 
sets of benchmarking results are consistent from year to year, we discuss the 
2001 results, and note one important discrepancy. 
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Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
In 2001, CLP generated a dividend that was €32,620 larger than the 
average dividend earned by the 47 less-successful CFIs. Since CLP had a 
slightly less favorable price structure, the entire dividend difference of 
€36,540 is attributable to CLP’s larger quantity effect. Although CLP incurred 
deposit and operating expenses averaging nearly €60,000 more than those of 
the less-successful CFIs, input deepening raised the value of output per 
worker at CLP by nearly €100,000 over that of the less-successful CFIs. This 
result is partly due to the almost one million depositors of the 130 Mondragón 
cooperatives that are members of CLP. The better performance also reflects 
the superior ability of CLP to convert deposits to loans, despite a smaller-tan-
average spread of 3.1%. Our decomposition of the quantity effect offers 
additional insight into CLP’s dividend advantage. The quantity effect is 
attributable to a €55,260 activity effect, which is offser partially by a €18,720 
cost efficiency reduction that reflects CLP’s excessive reliance on non-
financial capital. The decomposition results are consistent over time with the 
sole exception that CLP typically enjoyed a relatively favorable price 
structure. The lesson for less-successful CFIs is to attract more deposits and 
exploit their more favorable spread.22  
The benchmarking results relative to the seven more-successful CFIs 
in 2001 are smaller in magnitude. Compared to these cooperatives, CLP has 
a dividend disadvantage of €16,580 even though its price structure is 
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relatively favorable. The negative quantity effect may be attributed to a lower 
value of output per worker despite more extensive input deepening at CLP. 
Alternatively, it may be attributed to lower cost efficiency at CLP, augmented 
by a negative activity effect. The lesson for CLP from more-successful CFIs is 
to improve cost efficiency first, and then implement procedures to facilitate the 
conversion of deposits to loans and investments at a more favorable spread.  
 To summarize the results of the two benchmarking exercises, CLP has 
a more favorable price structure in all years, except 2001, and lower cost 
efficiency in all years than either more-successful or less successful 
cooperatives. Since these effects are almost offsetting and the technology 
effect is irrelevant in cross-sectional analysis, the activity effect becomes the 
key determinant of dividend performance. The activity effect is a quantity 
effect that is net of variation in technology and the differences in cost 
efficiency. By this measure, CLP is more productive than the less-successful 
CFIs and less productive than the more-successful CFIs. Because the value 
of loans and investments is highly correlated with the value of deposits, this 
productivity variation is the main source of dividend variation. Over the entire 
sample, the ratio of the value of loans and investments to the value of 
deposits averages 1.05, with a standard deviation of 0.04. In 2001, six of the 
seven more-successful CFIs had ratios above that of CLP’s at 1.07 and 44 of 
the 47 less-successful CFIs had ratios below that of CLP. Although input 
deepening is costly, a positive spread generates a proportionately larger 
value of output per worker and consequently a dividend advantage. This 
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result indicates that the ability to attract deposits and the ability to convert 
deposits to revenue-earning loans and investments are crucial to better 
dividend performance. 
  
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Dividend-seeking cooperatives of the Ward-Domar type adjust 
employment to equate the value of labor’s marginal product with the value of 
the endogenously determined dividend. Therefore, variation in the dividend 
implies variation in the value of labor’s marginal product leading to an 
inefficient allocation of labor among cooperatives. Limited labor mobility 
makes it likely that this resource misallocation will persist. We investigate the 
sources of dividend variation analytically and apply our technique to a panel 
of 59 Spanish cooperative financial institutions over the period from 1994 to 
2001.  
Our aggregate time series results indicate that dividend growth has 
been due primarily to input deepening, which has enhanced the value of 
output per worker more than proportionately to its cost. However, a 
substantial decline in returns on loans and investments, which was only partly 
offset by a smaller decline in interest paid on deposits, contributed adversely 
to dividend growth. Our cross-sectional benchmarking results in which we 
compare less-successful and more-successful CFIs to CLP reinforces the 
finding that input deepening is critical. Increases in deposits per worker 
generate proportionately larger increases in loans and investments per 
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worker, which earn a positive spread. Variation in cost efficiency is large but it 
is unrelated to dividend performance as both groups are more cost-efficient 
than CLP. Variation in the price structure is also large and positively related to 
dividend performance in all years except for 2001. 
 Our results have implications for the misallocation of labor in a 
cooperative economy. Our data indicate that dividend variation has been 
large and persistent, with coefficient of variation remaining stable at 0.33. In 
2001, one employee moving from a CFI with a dividend that is one standard 
deviation below the sample mean to a CFI with a dividend that is one 
standard deviation above the mean would generate a decline in the value of 
labor’s marginal product of €49,460 at the former and an increase of €92,160 
in the latter for a net gain of €42,700. This example indicates the cost of 
institutional and cultural constraints on the mobility of labor in the sector. In 
the financial sector, deposits are the source of loans and investments, so that 
variation in the ability to attract deposits and to convert them to profitable 
loans and investments is a critical source of dividend variation, and hence to 
labor misallocation. To the extent that variation in the ability to attract and 
convert deposits persists or increases among Spanish cooperative financial 
institutions, dividend variation and labor misallocation are likely to continue. 
The misallocation is particularly acute in Spain because labor mobility is 
culturally constrained. 
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Footnotes  
 
1
 We are grateful to Ministerio de Ciencia y Technologia, SEC2001-2793-
C03-01, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001SGR 00159, for their financial 
support, and to Pablo Font de Mora Sainz and Carmen Conde Rodriguez of 
UNACC for their assistance. A previous version of this paper was presented 
at the VIII European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, 
Oviedo, Spain. We are grateful to the audience for their comments and to the 
Editor and two referees for their very constructive criticism of that version. 
 
2
 A comparative exercise would be interesting because CFIs operate in an 
institutional environment similar to that of other commercial and savings 
banks, although savings banks are prohibited from issuing equity capital, and 
because detailed data are available for all three institutional types. However 
we focus on performance variation among CFIs because this variation has 
implications for a recurring theme in the theoretical literature that has not 
been studied empirically, namely, the inefficient allocation of labor among 
cooperatives. 
 
3
 Palomo (2000), Rodero Franganillo (1974) and Terrón Muñoz (1984) 
provide historical information. UNACC policies can be found at 
http://www.unacc.com. The procedures of most individual CFIs are reported 
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at http://www.unacc.com/defcajas.htm and the procedures of CLP are listed 
at http://www.cajalaboral.com. Thomas and Logan (1983) provide a good 
description of Mondragón; the policies of Mondragón Corporación 
Cooperativa are available at http://www.mondragon.mcc.es.  
 
4
 INE (2001) reports that only 0.83% of Spanish workers moved to another 
province in 2001, and only 2.4% of Spanish workers moved to another 
municipality, within or outside their home province.   
 
5
 This evidence is based on discussions with staff at UNACC and detailed 
information from auditors’ reports for 35 CFIs in 2001 and five CFIs in 2002. 
All of these CFIs are included in our sample. 
 
6
 A partial list of additional benefits includes a quarterly salary bonus equal to 
one month’s pay, full National Health Service benefits, a pension plan, a 
thirty-day paid vacation, paid leaves of absence for a variety of reasons, the 
availability of subsidized loans, educational support for employees and their 
children, and widow and orphan funds. 
 
7
 Excluding CLP and CP, which allocate 51% and 100%, respectively, of their 
Asamblea General funds to member cooperatives, and CR de Canarias, 
which allocates 90% of its Asamblea General funds to Investment for 
Canarias, 88% of the disbursements are put in the reserve fund. 
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8
 We find evidence that CFIs limit employment relative to comparison 
institutions. Palomo (2000) reports that, in 1999, CFIs had 3.7 employees per 
branch office, while savings banks had 5.3 and commercial banks had 7.7. 
CFIs were also more profitable, having a ROA of 1.20% compared with ROAs 
of 0.94% at savings banks and 0.66% at commercial banks. 
 
9
 Diewert (1998) provides a list of axioms satisfied by Bennet indicators and 
proves that Bennet indicators are invariant to changes in the units of 
measurement, so that I(pt,pt+1,qt,qt+1) = I(λpt,λpt+1,λ-1qt,λ-1qt+1) for any λ>0. 
Balk et al. (2004) claim that Bennet indicators are dimensionally invariant with 
the dimension being money. All components of the Bennet indicators in 
equation (4) are expressed in terms of euros. If all quantities are scaled by a 
positive λ, the corresponding prices are scaled by λ-1 and nothing changes.  
 
10
 The decomposition in equation (4) is analogous to a decomposition of profit 
found in the business literature, in which the price effect reflects the ability to 
pass through input price changes, as Miller (1984) explains. 
 
11
 Our decomposition of dividend variation is structurally similar to the 
decomposition of the variation in the gross return to capital defined in 
Lawrence et al. (2003), and in our notation G = pi + wKK. Normalizing G by K 
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generates a gross rate of return on capital that is structurally identical to D, 
with wK and K replacing wL and L. However we use Bennet indicators and 
they use Törnqvist indexes.  
 
12
 In Figure 2 the activity effect may also be measured along Tt with the 
technology effect measured at xCEt+1. 
 
13
 DEA is used to examine technical and scale efficiencies of Spanish CFIs by 
Millán (1997). An alternative frontier technique, stochastic frontier analysis, is 
used by Marco Gual and Moya Clemente (1999) to estimate scale economies 
and cost efficiency among Spanish CFIs. However, neither study is 
concerned with financial performance as reflected by the dividend. Both 
frontier techniques are used frequently to evaluate the performance of 
cooperative organizations and to compare their performance with that of 
capitalist twins.  
 
14
 Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1995) refer to this approach as sequential 
DEA; this technique does not allow technical regress because all previous 
technologies are incorporated in Tt. 
 
15
 These data are obtained from annual reports of Memorias de la Unión 
Nacional de la Asociación de Cooperativas de Crédito. The population of 
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Spanish CFIs remained at 95 from 1994 through 1998 and declined to 88 by 
2001. We deleted all CFIs with fewer than 15 employees and a few others 
having missing or inconsistent data. The decline in sample size from 59 to 55 
in 2001 is due to two mergers. 
 
16
 To put these nominal figures in perspective, inflation averaged 3% per year 
over the period. Regardless of whether labor income is measured by wages 
or the dividend, real growth has occurred. Nonetheless, incomes of CFI 
employees are not out of line with those of employees at capitalist twins. Over 
the sample period, employee wages at savings banks averaged 26% higher, 
with the same coefficient of variation, and wages at commercial banks 
averaged 22% higher, with a larger coefficient of variation. However, 
employees of commercial banks do not receive benefits comparable to those 
given to cooperative employees from the available surplus. Relatively high 
wages in Spanish financial institutions are a lingering consequence of a tightly 
regulated system, which had been closed to most foreign competition. 
Caminal et al. (1993) provide an interesting history of the Spanish financial 
system. 
 
17
 The deteriorating price structure is reflected in a narrowing spread between 
returns on loans and investments and interest paid on deposits from 4.8% to 
3.8%. On average, declining returns on loans and investments reduced the 
Bennet output price indicator by €11,540, while smaller but still substantial 
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declines in deposit rates made up €8,090 of the €8,330 reduction in the 
Bennet input price indicator.    
 
18
 The input deepening effect of -€6,220 decomposes into a cost of deposits 
per worker effect of -€5,240 and a cost of capital per worker effect of -€980, 
averaged over all institutions and all years. Thus, the major source of input 
deepening has been an increase in deposits, which are used to fund loans 
and investments. 
 
19
 We also calculated the two DEA exercises on the underlying technology, 
with and without the convexity constraint, to investigate the presence of scale 
economies. Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) and Vanek (1977) claim that 
attenuated property rights constrain cooperatives to operate in the increasing 
returns to scale region. We find that the variable returns to scale technology 
envelops the data more closely than does the constant returns to scale 
technology. Over all CFIs and all years, the ratio of minimum non-labor cost 
under constant returns to scale to minimum non-labor cost under variable 
returns to scale averages 0.920 with a standard deviation of 0.088. The two 
largest and the three smallest CFIs have the smallest mean ratios in the 
sample at approximately 0.7. This pattern is consistent with a classical U-
shaped average cost frontier, so it provides only modest support for the 
attenuated property rights hypothesis. 
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20
 This finding of over-investment in non-financial capital at CFIs in the 1990s 
is consistent with general findings for financial institutions. Although 
information technology may be the engine of productivity growth, it typically 
works with a lag as institutions move down their learning curves. 
 
21
 In any given year, individual CFIs adopt different production practices but 
cross-section analysis is capable of constructing only a single best practice 
technology. 
 
22
 CLP’s favorable large price indicator in all years except 2001 in Table 4 and 
in all years in Table 5 does not indicate pricing power. As Table 1 shows, little 
price variation is found across CFIs in any given year although considerable 
intertemporal price variation exists. CLP’s large price effect is due to large 
quantity weights rather than to large price differences. For example, (pCLP – 
pCFI) = 0.32%, (w1CLP – w1CFI) = 0.47%, and (w2CLP – w2CFI) = -0.26% for all 
benchmarking CFIs in 2000.  
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Figure 1  Decomposing the Dividend 
Figure 2  Decomposing the Quantity Effect 
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